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Abstract:The European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
are both fundamental international organizations in their respective geographical 
regions, striving to become key players in shaping the global political landscape, 
reaching out far beyond their borders. In light of this, one might think it was already 
timely to raise the two blocs’ partnership to the strategic level. Analysing official 
documents, and drawing upon previous researches in the field and a number of 
in-depth interviews with stakeholders from both sides of the EU-ASEAN ties, this 
article has given an outline on the development of relations between the two entities, 
with a particular focus on the political and economic domains. Highlighting the 
efforts made to pursue the elevation of ties to a Strategic Partnership, it concluded 
that ASEAN still primarily regards the EU as a trading partner with limited weight 
as a political and security actor. Protracted bilateral disputes between the EU and certain 
ASEAN member states also hindered the upgrade of relations for some time. The article 
argued that even though much has been done lately to approximate the two 
organisations’ viewpoints, and the long-awaited official announcement of the EU-
ASEAN Strategic Partnership that finally happened in December 2020 was beyond 
doubt an important milestone, there is still work to do to further streamline the ties. 
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Introduction
Since its founding in 1967, the economic and political role of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has increased immensely both within its 
region and beyond, and the number of its member states doubled from the initial 
five2. The global significance of the European Union (EU) is also unquestionable, 
especially in the economic domain. Being two of the world’s most advanced 
regional groupings, ASEAN and the EU are both fundamental international 
organizations in their respective geographical regions, striving to become key 
players in shaping the global political landscape, reaching out far beyond their 
borders. In light of this, one might think it was already timely and obvious to 
raise the EU-ASEAN partnership to a strategic level. However, due to certain 
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asymmetries in their relations and a number of ongoing disputes and tensions 
between the EU and some of the ASEAN member states, this is by no means as 
straightforward as it may first seem. 
The main guiding principle throughout this paper is to point out the way that led to 
the formalization of the ASEAN-EU Strategic Partnership in December 2020, a goal 
that the EU had been particularly keen to realize, at least in the last couple of years. 
Analysing official documents, and drawing upon previous research in the field and 
a number of in-depth interviews with stakeholders from both sides of the EU-
ASEAN ties, this article aims to give an outline regarding the nature of relations 
between the two entities. Following a brief comparison of ASEAN and the EU, and 
an overview of the development of ties between the two institutions, the article 
attempts to shed light on the possible benefits of a strategic partnership between 
the blocs. It highlights the shifts in the EU’s attitude towards ASEAN in the pursuit 
to be recognised as a Strategic Partner of the Southeast Asian grouping, arguing 
that the formal elevation of ties may increase the EU’s recognition as a key 
political and security actor not only in the Indo-Pacific region but also in the global 
arena. In the subsequent section of the paper, economic ties are discussed, with 
a special focus on some of the main trade-related issues between the EU and 
certain ASEAN countries, such as the (planned) withdrawal of benefits granted 
to Cambodia and Myanmar under the Everything But Arms scheme or the so-
called “palm oil case” that has been souring the EU’s relations with Indonesia and 
Malaysia over the recent years. The last section concludes the paper and places 
its findings into a wider context.
Comparing the Main Characteristics 
of ASEAN and the EU
Originally, both ASEAN and the European Economic Community (EEC), the EU’s 
predecessor, were established with the aim of enhancing stability and economic 
development in their respective regions. It is also worth noting that both organizations 
were accorded legal personality around the same time, via the ASEAN Charter in 
2008 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, respectively. Certain institutional similarities 
can also be found between ASEAN and the European Union – take for instance 
the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, or the 
European Council and the ASEAN Summit, although the latter sits less frequently 
and has no legislative function. Upon having a closer look at their structure, however, 
one may conclude that the two represent different types of integration. While the EU 
is a supranational entity, ASEAN is a much looser, intergovernmental organization 
(ASEAN Secretariat [ASEC], 2008). Also, there is no institution resembling the 
European Parliament in ASEAN.
Apart from these, there are a number of other significant differences, too. Unlike 
the strict bureaucratic structure of the EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
operates via an extensive network of working groups and meetings of a more informal 
nature, guided by the so-called “ASEAN Way”. This encompasses principles such as 
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non-interference into each other’s interior affairs and a soft diplomacy approach 
where decisions are made with consensus reached via long consultations in a non-
confrontational, informal manner, often referred to as “musjawarat-mufakat” in the 
Malay culture. No final decision is taken without the consent of all the member 
states, and the lengthy negotiations conducted in a conflict-avoiding manner provide 
delegates the opportunity to deepen their relations with each other, which helps 
fortify unity within ASEAN (Barbi, 1982). This method has not changed since the 
establishment of the organization, moreover, this unique system of soft institutions 
arguably proved to be the secret of ASEAN’s stability throughout its existence of 
more than fifty years. At the same time, this time-consuming process of decision-
making may result in limited effectiveness in certain situations that require prompt 
actions (Páldi, 2019).
Another important difference is the depth of integration. With the single market 
and the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, the EU is 
currently the most integrated economic community in the world where the same 
trade policies and regulations apply to all member states, in almost every sectors. 
ASEAN, on the other hand, is still a long way from becoming a unified market 
even though the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at 
the end of 2015 was an important milestone towards this way, and the ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint 2025 sets out even more ambitious goals. ASEAN 
member states favour upholding their sovereign trade policies and this is unlikely 
to change anytime soon. Nine out of the ten ASEAN countries (with Thailand 
being the only exception) are former colonial states who regained independence 
not long before the organization was established, hence keeping their political 
and economic sovereignty is of utmost significance to them even if this means 
that regional integration has to happen at a slower pace.
Despite differing in structure and approach, ASEAN and the EU still share 
similar core values. Over their decades of existence, both of them grew out to 
be fundamental organizations in their respective geographical regions, striving 
to become key players in shaping the global political landscape, reaching out far 
beyond their geographic borders. In light of this, one might think that the EU and 
ASEAN would make natural allies.
A Brief Overview of the History                                        
of the EU-ASEAN Partnership
The relations between ASEAN and the EU look back on a history spanning over 
almost half a century. The first ministerial level contact between ASEAN and the 
EEC took place in 1972, subsequently, ties formalized in 1977 when the EEC 
became ASEAN’s Dialogue Partner (European External Action Service [EEAS], 
2020). The year 1978 saw the first-ever ASEAN-EEC Ministerial Meeting and in 
1980, a commercial-, economic- and development-focused Cooperation Agreement 
was signed providing legal framework for regular Ministerial Meetings and Joint 
Cooperation Committee (JCC) sittings between the two entities (EEC, 1980).
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The changing geopolitical landscape with the end of the Cold War, and the 
impressive economic growth realised by the ASEAN states created the need to step 
up cooperation and review the framework of relations (European Commission 
[EC], 1996). Besides the economic achievements, the political weight of ASEAN 
also grew with the 1994 establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
the first region-wide Asia-Pacific multilateral platform for fostering consultation 
on political and security issues. Initially, the ten ASEAN member states and 
Dialogue Partners (including the EU) were granted membership to ARF and 
over the years, the number of members rose to 27.3
ASEAN’s increasingly important role further added to the EU’s motivation to 
strengthen political dialogue, although this intention was not always reciprocal. 
While the EU has been participating at ARF since the forum’s inaugural sitting in 
1994, this is not the case with the East Asia Summit (EAS) which was formed in 
2005 by the ten ASEAN member states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand and South Korea. Aiming to provide leaders a forum for strategic 
dialogue and cooperation regarding the East Asian region’s key challenges, EAS 
is akin to ARF in many ways, though contrary to the ministerial-level ARF, EAS 
is conducted at the highest level with the participation of heads of government 
from respective member states hence its relevance is also significantly higher. 
Although the EU has been signaling its interest to engage with the EAS since as 
early as 2007 (EC, 2007), its admission still hasn’t been considered yet. Russia 
and the United States however, managed to gain membership in the meantime 
in 2011. This implies that, as opposed to the above two powers, the EU is 
considered a less significant actor in the region from a political and security 
point of view.
In order to change this, the EU decided to step up efforts and in the EC’s 
Communication titled “A new partnership with South East Asia”, expressed 
its endeavor to revitalize relations with the region (EC, 2004). The initiative 
found welcoming ears in ASEAN, and in 2007, at their 16th Ministerial Meeting 
in Nuremberg, the two organizations accepted the Declaration on an EU-ASEAN 
Enhanced Partnership (EC, 2007a). The parties also agreed to work out 
a Plan of Action for the period of 2007-2012 to realize the enhancement of 
cooperation in the fields of political, economic and socio-cultural cooperation 
along the guidelines set by the Nuremberg Declaration (ASEC, 2007). Further 
ambitious steps along the way for the following five years were enshrined in the 
Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced 
Partnership (2013-2017) in 2012. 
In summary, four decades after the first contact and 35 years after formalizing 
the ties, relations between the two organisations had evolved to a strengthened 
and enhanced status. As a next step, at the 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
in 2014, held under the theme “Towards Strategic Partnership for Peace, Stability 
and Prosperity”, the EU proposed to upgrade further the ties and elevate them 
to the highest level, declaring a strategic partnership. ASEAN, while not openly 
rejecting the idea, opined there is still work to do in this domain and the instant 
elevation of the status of relations eventually did not happen. Instead, as stated 
in the Co-Chairs’ Statement issued after the Meeting, the sides merely “agreed 
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to work towards the upgrading of the partnership to a strategic one” (Council 
of the European Union, 2014). Similarly, the next Ministerial Meeting in 2016 in 
Bangkok did not produce spectacular results either with the parties only resolving 
to “accelerate efforts in working towards a strategic partnership” (ASEC, 2016).
The year 2017 marked the first-ever, and so far the only, formal summit at 
leaders’ level4 in the joint history of the two blocks. During the event entitled 
“ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary 
of the Establishment of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations”, the leaders welcomed 
the adoption of the new ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022 and once again 
reiterated their intention to achieve strategic partnership (ASEC, 2017). 
The Summit apparently gave a new momentum to the ties and ASEAN finally 
seemed to give in, its leaders agreeing upon giving their consent to the long-
awaited strategic partnership, which was supposed to be announced at the 22nd 
EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on January 21, 2019 in Brussels. However, in 
the last minute, Indonesia and Malaysia vetoed the deal as a de facto retaliatory 
measure against the recast of the EU’s renewable energy directive (RED II) 
which in their view takes discriminative measures against palm oil, one of the 
main export commodities of the two countries. As a result, on the Ministerial 
Meeting, the sides only agreed “in principle to upgrade EU-ASEAN relations to 
a Strategic Partnership, subject to details and timing to be worked out” (ASEC, 
2019a). So, following years of reluctance, this time, bilateral trade-related 
issues between the EU and certain ASEAN member states turned out to be the 
showstopper that stalled the planned elevation of ties. 
This stalemate lasted for almost two years, with Indonesia and Malaysia 
seeming quite rigid regarding their standpoint. Still, despite the less than 
favorable outlook, a historical breakthrough was reached at the next, 23rd 
ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting on December 1, 2020. The parties agreed 
on conducting the inaugural session of the joint working group on vegetable 
oils in early 2021, a platform on which the EU and relevant ASEAN member 
states can hopefully work their way towards resolving the palm oil issue, and 
simultaneously, the formal upgrade of ties to a Strategic Partnership did also 
eventually take place. It is important to point out, however, that oddly, the 
official five-page long communique of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting 
touches upon this important milestone in a rather brief manner, merely informing 
that the parties “elevated the ASEAN-EU Dialogue Partnership to a Strategic 
Partnership” (ASEC, 2020a). On the other hand, the texts goes unusual lengths 
to commend the EU’s contribution to help ASEAN mitigate the effects of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and to highlight the “robust economic cooperation” between 
the two entities. In light of the above, one may conclude that the elevation of ties 
happened not necessarily as a result of the ripeness of relations between the 
two organisations, but rather because of the stakeholders’ necessity to put aside 
their assertiveness in favor of the post-pandemic economic recovery against the 
background of a changing global landscape. How the parties will fill the freshly 
elevated cooperation with actual content remains to be seen.
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The Benefits of a Strategic Partnership
Even before becoming officially announced strategic partners, the two entities 
already shared an extensive set of platforms for consultation such as the ASEAN-
EU Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN-EU Senior Officials’ Meeting, the ASEAN-EU 
Joint Cooperation Committee, or even ARF and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 
among others. All these are regularly convening forums. Besides, a senior official 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia 
pointed out, the so-called Guidelines for ASEAN’s External Relations, an internal 
document adopted at the 47th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2014, do not 
provide definitions of any kind regarding strategic partnership. The Guidelines list 
the different categories of engagement with external partners, namely Dialogue 
Partnership, Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, Development Partnership, and 
statuses such as Special Observer and Guest5 but there is no mention regarding 
enhanced, comprehensive or strategic partnerships (Sok, 2020). In light of this, 
the question may rightfully arise: what would be the actual benefits of a strategic 
partnership, and what is in it for the EU that was worth long years of pursuing? 
Based on the dynamics of relations between ASEAN and its other strategic 
partners, the much-discussed elevation of partnership with the EU would bring 
about only one tangible difference, namely the possibility to hold summits 
regularly, typically at a biannual basis. While it does not sound much at first, 
the idea of regular ASEAN-EU Summits is not something to belittle; much more 
weight could be put behind the talks if there are regular high-level interactions 
between the sides, and it would naturally deepen political ties. On top of this, the 
formal establishment of strategic partnership could also serve as a steppingstone 
for the EU to achieve some long-standing political goals in the region like gaining 
admission to other ASEAN-led platforms such as the EAS or the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting Plus6 formation. 
ASEAN currently has ten Dialogue Partners, of which eight had already been 
granted strategic status before the EU. The EU-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 
commenced in 1977 and it took more than four decades for the ties to reach 
the level of Strategic Partnership. China, in comparison, became ASEAN’s first 
strategic partner in 2003, even though the status of ties between the two sides 
only emerged to a full Dialogue Partnership in 1996 (ASEC, 2020b). The latest 
addition to the list of strategic partners before the EU was Russia in 2018, with 
whom official dialogues formalized in 1996, similar to China (ASEC, 2019b). 
The above once again indicates that the EU, despite being an important 
economic partner, is still not significant enough as a political and security actor 
in the eyes of ASEAN. This is a bitter pill to swallow for the EU, who is striving to 
increase its role as a global security provider and, in general, to create a ‘stronger 
Europe’ as set out in its 2016 global strategy (EEAS, 2016). In the wake of Brexit, 
and with Euroscepticism on the rise, these goals gain even more importance. 
Herein lies the real benefit: the recent recognition of the EU as ASEAN’s strategic 
partner is expected to contribute to solidifying EU’s image both in the Indo-Pacific 
region and at the global table. 
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Still, in the Co-Chairs’ Press Release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, 
the official communique of the event, there is no hint yet to the EU’s planned 
accession to important ASEAN-led platforms such as the EAS or the ADMM Plus, 
neither there is a mention of any specific tangible goals that may directly stem 
from the long-awaited upgrade of relations. Even though strategic partnership is an 
existing and frequently used phrase in the dictionary of ASEAN, it still lacks clear 
definition (Sok, 2020), so now that the EU-ASEAN ties have officially been elevated 
to the highest level, the main question is how to fill them with content.
Shifts in Attitude
In recent years, the EU put great efforts into deepening its ties with ASEAN. 
However, this had not always been the case. In the first three decades of the 
Dialogue Partnership, the central focus was mainly on the development of 
economic relations (Camroux, 2008) while, from a political point of view, the EU did 
not attribute much attention to the region and adopted a somewhat condescending 
attitude (Xuechen, 2018). Over concerns for human rights issues, the EU even 
suspended the meetings with ASEAN after the 1997 accession of Myanmar for a 
period of almost three years. This underlines that in their relations with ASEAN, 
the EU traditionally perceived itself as a role model, and felt obliged to promote 
its views in the region on human rights and democracy. The EU’s norm-exporting 
attempts were met with the ASEAN member states’ resentment as they deemed 
such actions as a violation of their basic principle of non-interference. However, 
even though political talks were on hold, trade and dialogue in the field of common 
economic interests did not cease between the two blocks (de Flers, 2010).
After the turn of the millennium, parallel to ASEAN’s increasingly impressive 
economic growth and rising interregional political significance, the EU changed 
its approach as it gradually started to comprehend the nature of Southeast Asian 
integration and its main guiding principles, and dampened its norm-setting attitude 
(Xuechen, 2018). While the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration and its message to 
enhance the EU-ASEAN partnership was an important milestone exhibiting the will 
to start a new era in the relations, it was in 2012 when the EU started to noticeably 
put more political focus on Southeast Asia (Nuttin, 2017). Besides the ambitious 
Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action, in the same year, the EU also acceded to 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), as the first regional 
organisation to do so. The TAC, originally a product of the first-ever ASEAN Summit 
in 1976, is an important cornerstone of ASEAN’s philosophy, technically a peace 
treaty promoting non-use of force, non-interference, territorial integrity and equality.
Besides being a precondition for membership of the East Asia Summit, signing 
the TAC was also a gesture from the EU to acknowledge ASEAN’s central role in 
the region and to express respect towards the fact that the Southeast Asian states 
chose a different path of integration than that of Europe. Since then, the EU has 
been actively emphasizing that they are ‘natural partners’ with ASEAN and theirs 
is a “partnership of equals”, what is more, the EU’s 2016 global strategy expresses 
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support for “an ASEAN-led regional security architecture” (EEAS, 2016). In 2015, 
to further demonstrate commitment, in addition to its already existing bilateral 
diplomatic missions in the region7, the EU launched a separate mission dedicated 
exclusively to oversee ASEAN affairs and to underline its ambition to elevate the ties 
to a strategic one (EEAS, n.d.).
Although there is no universal definition to it, a partnership of strategic nature 
may imply a comprehensive approach in which participants share common goals 
and somewhat similar views, and conduct cooperation in a wide array of areas such 
as the trade, political and security dimensions, inter alia (Tyushka & Czechowska, 
2019). Economic ties have always been strong between the EU and ASEAN. In the 
political dimension, too, despite some asymmetry, much has been achieved for the 
approximation of views and to better understand each other’s motives, especially 
in recent years. In the area of security dialogue, however, there is quite some 
disparity between the two organisations and still much room to grow. This is despite 
the EU engaging into cooperation with ASEAN in certain fields, such as maritime and 
non-traditional threats (e.g. cybercrime). ASEAN is already an accomplished actor even 
in the broader region, as it managed to balance between great powers such the US 
and China, and initiated and led pioneering platforms for regional political and security 
discussions in the Indo-Pacific. Whereas, to paraphrase the words of Belgium’s then-
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mark Eyskens from 1991, the EU, even though an economic 
giant, is still viewed as “a political dwarf and a military worm” in the Southeast Asian 
region. ASEAN and its member states still primarily regard the EU as a trade partner, 
with relatively marginal influence in the political and security domains.
Economic Ties and the State of Play of Free Trade 
Agreements
Throughout its history, economic ties have always been the strongest leg of the 
EU-ASEAN relations. Even the first-ever contact between the two entities, in June 
1972, was economy-related in nature, when the Commission received an ASEAN 
delegation led by the Indonesian Minister of Trade, to discuss trade benefits (EC, 
1996), and since then, trade has never stopped being the centrepiece of ties. There 
are a number of instruments and platforms in place to help further strengthen the 
economic cooperation and facilitate ASEAN-EU trade, such as the regular meetings 
between the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the EU Trade Commissioner or 
the ASEAN-EU Business Summit. As Diagram 1 shows, trade has been steadily 
growing between the two regions during the last decade as well. In 2018, the EU 
was ASEAN’s second largest trading partner, surpassing the US and preceded only 
by China, whereas ASEAN was the third most important trading partner for the EU, 
following the US and China, with the total EU-ASEAN trade in goods amounting to 
EUR 235 billion or USD 288 billion (ASEC, 2019c). This means that during the course 
of ten years, merchandise trade grew more than 70% between the two blocks, while 
trade in services more than doubled, from EUR 40 billion in 2007 reaching EUR 88.3 
billion in 2017 (EEAS, 2020).
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Diagram 1
 ASEAN Trade in Goods by Most Significant Trading Partners
 (2009-2018), in USD milion8
As seen on Diagram 2, with USD 21.61 billion, the EU was the biggest provider 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN in 2018 (not counting intra-ASEAN 
investments), providing 14.1% of the total FDI influx, followed by Japan (13.7%), 
Hong Kong (6.6%), China (6.5%) and the US (5.5%) (ASEC, 2019c).
Diagram 2
FDI in ASEAN in 2018 by Source Country in USD billion9
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ASEAN has already signed free trade agreements with six10 out of its ten Dialogue 
Partners (or six out of its nine Strategic Partners, for that matter), namely Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand (ASEC, n.d.). As for the 
European Union, the intention of establishing an ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) was officially announced in 2006. Talks started in 2007 only to quickly come 
to a halt in 2009 due to a number of complications, mainly because the differences 
in the levels of development between ASEAN member states were too great and 
their diverging interests regarding the deal. Myanmar’s position, then still boycotted 
by the EU over human rights issues, also hindered the progress (Cuyvers, Chen, 
Goethals & Ghislain, 2013). As a result, negotiations were reoriented towards 
bilateral trade agreements between the EU and certain ASEAN member states, 
with the idea that these pacts may function as building blocks for a future region-to-
region FTA (EEAS, 2020).
The EU’s two most important trading partners within the ASEAN are Singapore 
and Vietnam so it does not come as a surprise that agreements with them were 
the first to realise. With Singapore, negotiations started in 2009, finished in 2015, 
the FTA was signed in 2018, and entered into force on November 21, 2019. Talks 
concerning the trade agreement with Vietnam began in 2012, concluded in 2013, 
the signing took place in 2018, and August 1, 2020 marked its coming into force 
(EC, 2020a). The EU-Malaysia FTA negotiations were launched in 2010 but Malaysia 
requested to put them on hold in 2012 as they reached an impasse. In 2016-17, 
a stocktaking exercise was conducted to look into the possibilities of resumption. 
However, the “palm oil issue” that since emerged and related to the EU’s RED II 
directive soured ties, making a resumption highly unlikely. For the same reason, talks 
over a comprehensive economic partnership agreement with Indonesia, the world’s 
largest palm oil producer, slowed down significantly despite a promising start in 2016. 
With Thailand, negotiations about an FTA commenced in 2013 but halted the next 
year as the result of the military take-over. With an elected Thai government back 
in place, in 2019, the EU expressed its openness to resume talks. Regarding the 
trade and investment agreement with the Philippines, so far, two negotiating rounds 
took place in 2016 and 2017 but no date has been set yet for the next round. As per 
Myanmar, shortly after the country embarked on a process of democratic reform in 
2011, the EU lifted its sanctions and in 2014, negotiations on an investment protection 
agreement commenced, though, due to the Rohingya crisis, its progress stopped in 
2017. With Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, no negotiations have started yet (EEAS, 
2020). Overall, in the last ten years, bilateral trade agreements were completed with 
only two countries in the region, and talks are currently ongoing with another two. 
That is not even half of the ASEAN member states, while negotiations with the rest of 
the members are on hold, or have yet to commence.
In 2017, after the US withdrew from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, the EU and ASEAN rewarmed to the idea of their region-to-region trade 
pact and established a Joint Working Group to set out parameters for a possible 
future agreement (EC, 2020b). Until now, the group met three times, with February 
2020 marking the latest sitting, however, the ambitious interregional FTA is not on 
the horizon yet, even though the Co-Chairs’ Press Release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU 
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Ministerial Meeting on December 1, 2020 testifies about the two organisations’ 
commitment to further efforts towards creating a practical framework for it. The realistic 
assessment is that sealing bilateral free trade deals with all ten ASEAN countries 
is nearly impossible as not all of them are ready yet to enter into such a pact with 
the EU. Not to mention that the EU is also reluctant to engage in talks with some of 
these countries over significantly conflicting views regarding certain core principles 
such as democracy or human rights. That said, pursuing the pipe dream of a region-
to-region FTA still reflects genuine political will on both sides, and it is definitely a 
good-sounding motto that can be utilized to build momentum in the region towards 
integration and free trade, notions that are highly endorsed by the EU globally.
Economy-related Controversies
Though its member states are much more loosely integrated and are far from being 
as unified as the European single market, it does not mean ASEAN is not striving 
to step up its processes of integration, a venture the EU is happy to support while 
also promoting its own role as a “partner in integration” (EEAS, 2015). In order to 
underpin its purpose to scale up partnership, on top of the bilateral development 
support to the respective ASEAN member states totaling  EUR 2 billion, the EU 
is also the biggest donor to the ASEAN Secretariat, providing EUR 200 million of 
grant funding in the 2014-2020 period to the ASEAN Secretariat (EEAS, 2019). 
This is more than double the amount of funds provided in the 2007-2013 cycle, and 
ten times as much as the ASEAN member states’ accumulated annual contribution 
to ASEC of USD 2 million each. The EU development funds granted to the ASEAN 
Secretariat along with the EUR 94 million ARISE Plus11 instrument is mainly used 
to enhance economic and trade connectivity within the block.
The generous support from the EU unquestionably contributes greatly to ASEAN’s 
integration process. However, it may also come with some side effects as it may 
amplify the undesirable stereotype still prevailing in some ASEAN countries, namely 
that the ties between the two entities can be described merely as a top-down 
‘donor-recipient’ relationship. This contradicts the EU’s intention of diversifying and 
deepening the dimensions of cooperation. What is more, this is by no means the only 
thing that may come off controversially in the eyes of certain ASEAN member states.
Another example is the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) arrangement in regard to 
Cambodia and Myanmar. Under the EU’s EBA initiative, as part of the Generalized 
Scheme of Preferences, products from states classified as Least Developed 
Countries12 enjoy duty and quota free entry to the European single market as 
stipulated in the Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. However, in 2018, over concerns 
regarding political, labor and human rights in Cambodia and Myanmar, the EU 
stepped up its engagement and initiated investigations that could possibly result 
in the suspension of benefits granted to these countries under the EBA scheme. 
This is a serious threat, since the EU is one of the most important markets for both 
Cambodia and Myanmar, and thanks to EBA, export to the European Union grew 
immensely from both countries over the last couple of years. 
107The EU-ASEAN Ties: A Strategic Partnership?
Foreign Policy Review
An EC report from February 2020 states that since Myanmar had shown 
considerable progress in some key issues over the last two years, the EU would 
not yet exclude the country from the benefits of EBA, although it would continue its 
enhanced engagement and closely monitor the situation of human rights and other 
areas deemed problematic (EC, 2020c). The outcome in the case of Cambodia 
was less favorable: progress was assessed as insufficient and eventually, via 
a delegated regulation effective from August 12, 2020, the EBA benefits were 
partially withdrawn, affecting some one-fifth of the annually EUR 5 billion strong 
Cambodian export towards the EU (EC, 2020d). This may naturally disrupt ties, 
not to mention that the (partial) withdrawal of the EBA benefits, or even the threat 
of it (as was the case with Myanmar) might help push the affected countries 
onto China’s lap. In addition, since decision-making in ASEAN works based on 
consensus, with every member states having the right to veto, tensions with 
Cambodia and Myanmar could potentially obstruct the EU in reaching its goals with 
the Southeast Asian bloc, despite the newly obtained strategic status.
In addition to the above, the issue that spurred the most tensions and drew the 
biggest media attention of late was the EU’s RED II directive and its effects related to 
palm oil. The original Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) is set to expire at the 
end of 2020, and a recast had been in preparation since November 2016 and finally, 
the revised directive or RED II (2018/2001/EU) for the 2021-2030 period gained 
shape and entered into force in December 2018. As a major change compared to 
its predecessor, RED II classifies palm oil as a commodity with high indirect land-
use change (ILUC) risk that technically means it is not sustainable and therefore it 
shall be gradually phased out of biofuels used in transport by 2030. Since this may 
potentially reduce the influx of palm oil to the EU, the directive sparked outrage in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, the two biggest palm oil producers in the world. The palm oil 
industry has extraordinarily big lobby power in both countries, so it is hardly surprising 
that as a de facto response to RED II, the brake was pulled on the announcement of 
the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership at the last minute and the official elevation of ties 
did not happen as originally planned in January 2019. 
While the EU’s main concerns regarding palm oil are related to the environmental 
damage the palm oil industry may cause, the standpoint of Indonesia and Malaysia is 
that the sector contributes to the Sustainable Development Goals (especially to SDG1 
regarding poverty eradication) by providing livelihoods for millions of people in the two 
countries. They claim that RED II singles out palm oil of all the vegetable oils, and that 
the EU is running a discriminatory campaign against the commodity with the aim of 
replacing it in the single market with European-produced soybean and rapeseed oils. 
The above standpoint is reflected in the joint letter of Indonesian President Joko 
Widodo and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad dated  April 5, 2019 
addressed to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council and EC President Jean-
Claude Juncker, following the 13 March 2019 adoption of the Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2019/807 that lays out the implementation of RED II. In the document, the two 
Southeast Asian leaders express their disapproval as well as their readiness to take 
retaliatory measures if necessary. In their reply dated  June 4, 2019, Tusk and Juncker 
reiterated that RED II may be reviewed in mid-2021 and that a palm oil working group 
is planned to be set up. Indeed, the Joint Statement of the 22nd EU-ASEAN Ministerial 
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Meeting from January 2019 states that the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and EU 
Member States “welcome the establishment of a joint working group between the EU 
and relevant ASEAN Member States to address issues relating to palm oil”. However, 
progress regarding the realization of this vegetable oil working group had been 
slow until very recently and in the meantime, Indonesia filed a lawsuit at the WTO 
regarding palm oil on December 9, 2019, and Malaysia has also announced its 
readiness to follow.
Even though the pandemic-induced global recession forced stakeholders to 
adopt a somewhat more flexible approach within settling their disputes, and the 
Co-Chairs’ Press Release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in December 
2020 hints that the inaugural session of the joint working group on vegetable 
oils may eventually take place in January 2021, the palm oil issue is still unlikely 
to come to a quick resolution. Also, having protracted tensions with Indonesia 
and Malaysia diminishes the EU’s chances of gaining the ASEAN member 
states’ full support in realizing the potential that lies within the freshly announced 
strategic partnership. Officially both ASEAN and the EU share the same view, 
namely that individual member states’ bilateral concerns with each other should 
not overshadow regional cooperation and the key achievements in the ASEAN-
EU relations (“Sengketa Minyak Sawit”, 2019), the reality, however, looks a bit 
different. Although not all ASEAN member states are involved, Malaysian Minister 
of Primary Industries, Theresa Kok openly stated to the media that palm oil was the 
deal-breaker for the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership in January 2019, and the 
elevation of ties should not be possible until the dispute related to the commodity 
is settled (Valero, 2019).
To sum up, even though economic cooperation is a strong backbone to the 
ASEAN-EU partnership, at the end of the day it can be broken down to bilateral 
trade ties with the member states. This lowers the political price ASEAN has to 
pay when entering into a debate with the EU, since glitches in the relations at the 
EU-level do not (most of the time) disrupt the trade between the respective member 
states which overall puts the EU into a less favorable bargaining position. Besides, 
having less than ideal relations with approximately half of the ASEAN countries 
definitely won’t help the EU either in maximizing the advantages of its newly 
established strategic partnership with the Southeast Asian bloc. Especially given 
that the consensus-based decision making of ASEAN opens up the possibility for 
its members to leverage their national interests via the organisation, as we saw it 
happen at the 22nd EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in January 2019, when the veto 
of Indonesia and Malaysia turned out to be a showstopper for almost two years, 
a period which could probably have lasted even longer were it not for Covid-19.
Conclusion and Outlook
Despite a number of similarities, the EU and ASEAN represent two relatively 
different ways of integration, the former being the most integrated economic 
community in the world with supranational characteristics, whereas the latter is 
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a much looser intergovernmental cooperation where non-interference and national 
sovereignty is vital. Still, both groupings are fundamental regional organisations 
seemingly eligible to be each other’s natural allies, at least at first sight. Having 
a closer look, however, reveals that in the first couple of decades following the 
inception of ties between the two entities in the 1970s, the EU-ASEAN relations 
were not attributed much significance.
This changed after the turn of the millennium, when the EU, as a reaction to 
Southeast Asia’s impressive economic growth and rising political significance (with 
the 2005 establishment of the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit being a particularly 
important milestone), started to look into strengthening cooperation with the bloc. 
To further step up the relations, since 2014, the EU had actively been seeking to 
elevate ties with ASEAN to the level of a Strategic Partnership, an upgrade that 
took six years to realize, much longer than first anticipated, mainly due to ASEAN’s 
reluctance.
While one may argue that the cooperation between the two entities was already 
strategic in nature, the official announcement of the elevation of ties is still a 
significant achievement, as it can potentially strengthen the EU’s position, recently 
weakened by Brexit and rising Euroscepticism, in both the Indo-Pacific region 
and in the global arena in general. After all, ASEAN was already in Strategic 
Partnership with technically all the major powers such as China, Russia, and the 
USA and the EU naturally did not want to be left out. 
Although lacking any official definition, the term “Strategic Partnership” 
implies a multifaceted cooperation between the participating parties. Applying 
this to the EU-ASEAN relations would mean that ties are almost equally sound 
in the socio-cultural, political-security and economic-trade domains. This paper 
investigated the latter two and concluded that while economic ties have always 
been strong between the two organisations, in the field of political and security 
cooperation, certain asymmetries can be observed. ASEAN and its member 
states still primarily regard the EU as a trading partner, simply not significant 
enough as a political and security actor in the Indo-Pacific. Besides, some 
ASEAN member states still tend to view the EU as a condescending norm-
exporter and development aid provider, despite its efforts to position itself in 
the region as an “equal partner” and a “partner in integration”. This is further 
amplified via a number of bilateral issues between the EU and certain ASEAN 
countries, namely the (proposed) withdrawal of EBA benefits from Cambodia and 
Myanmar, and the RED II directive that, according to Indonesia and Malaysia, 
may negatively influence palm oil exports to Europe. The latter resulted in the 
veto on the formal inception of the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership in January 
2019, creating an impasse that took the parties almost two years to overcome. 
Even though in the last couple of years ASEAN and the EU put in a great deal 
of effort to approximate their viewpoints and better understand each other, and 
the long-awaited official announcement of the EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership 
that finally happened on December 1, 2020 was beyond doubt an important 
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Endnotes
1 This article reflects the author’s own findings and does not represent the stand-
point of the Government of Hungary.
2 The founding members of ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Singapore. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myan-
mar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, respectively.
3 The current 27 members of ARF are the ten ASEAN member states, the ten 
ASEAN Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States of America), Bangladesh, 
Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste, and Papua New 
Guinea (as ASEAN observer.
4 At the Summit, the EU was represented by Donald Tusk, President of the Euro-
pean Council, who also got invited as a guest to the luncheon of EAS leaders.
5 Article 44 of the ASEAN Charter regarding the status of external parties lists the 
exact same categories.
6 The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), established in 2006, is the 
organization’s highest defense consultative and cooperative mechanism, while 
the ADMM Plus formation convenes with the participation of eight ASEAN Di-
alogue Partners, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, 
South Korea and the United States.
7 Currently, EEAS is present with bilateral diplomatic missions in nine out of ten 
ASEAN capitals, Brunei being the only exception. Overseeing relations with Bru-
nei belong under the duties of the EU Delegation in Jakarta.
8 Source: ASEAN Secretariat, edited by the author.
9 Source: ASEAN Secretariat, edited by the author.
10 These countries are also in a strategic partnership with ASEAN. Together, they 
were the initial participants of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Agree-
ment (RCEP) negotiations, though India pulled out in 2019.
11 The abbreviation is derived from ’Enhanced ASEAN Regional Support from the EU’.
12 The classification of Least Developed Countries is carried out by the United Nations.
